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PRIVATIZATION VERSUS COMPETITION:
CHANGING ENTERPRISE BEHVAVIOR IN RUSSIA
J. EARLE and S. ESTRIN
“There is no point in liberalizing prices before the
monopolies have been dismantled."    G. Yavlinsky
(January 1994).
"More important in many cases than changing the
'ownership' is changing the market structure - subjecting
these enterprises to competition."    J. Stiglitz (1994, p.
136).
1. INTRODUCTION
Economists have long regarded competition and private ownership as
the key disciplines on enterprise performance and efficiency.  In this
paper, we investigate whether competitive forces and privatization have
yet begun to play an efficiency-enhancing role in the process of
economic transition from plan to market in one of the most important
experiments with economic reform; Russia between 1992 and 1994.
We also explore the economic effects on enterprise behavior of another
key element in reform, namely the hardening of budget constraints.  We
conclude that while privatization is having a positive impact, domestic
market structure is not a significant determinant of company
performance.  However Russian firms are sensitive to the degree of
import penetration.  The effects of harder budget constraints on
enterprise behaviour is found to be more modest.
There is a growing literative on economic transition (see eg
Blanchard etal (1990), Portes (1993), World Bank Development
Report (1996)).  Issues which receive serpeated stress are price (and
trade) liberalisation, privatization and “depoliticisation” - reducing the
economic links between enterprises and the state - including the
hardening of budget constraints.  Economic theory has predictions
2about how these may be expected to affect enterprise behavior (see eg
Estrin (1994) MacMillan (1996) and Aghion and Blanchard (1996))
and these have been tested to some extent for Central Europe.1  Our
aim in this paper is to test these hypotheses together, and for the
important case of Russia.  We also test the idea that privatization and
competition may have complementary effects on enterprise
performance, so that the effects of either factor is increased by a larger
value of the other.
Russia is a particularly interesting testing ground because it has
undergone enormous changes in these areas of reform in recent years.
Thus, government budget subsidies to firms have been massively
reduced since 1992, while liberalization has proceeded apace.
According to the EBRD Transition Report, 1995, we find on a 1-4
scale for progress in liberalization, Russia is awarded a 3 on prices and
on trade respectively; only slightly below the most advanced reform
countries like Poland or Hungary.  Moreover, Russia has carried out a
major mass privatization programme, transferring shares in more than
12,000 companies from state to private hands. 
There is already a significant Western literature on the relative
importance of competition and ownership structures on enterprise
behavior (see eg Bishop, Kay and Mayer(1994), Geroski and
Jacquemin (1981), Nickell (1995)).  One might expect stronger results
for transitional economies.  This is because Western economies are
dominated by private ownership and "workably competitive" markets,
so that the general environment may still exert a disciplining force.
State-owned monopolies usually operate in competitive markets for
managers, labor, and most other factors; they can avail themselves of
the latest technologies, organizational innovations, and managerial
techniques; their performance can be compared, according to a
common set of standards, with neighboring privately owned,
competitive firms; and instances of gross malfeasance can be publicly
evaluated and remedied through a democratic process.  All of these
factors would seem to go quite some distance towards mitigating
inefficiencies associated with state ownership and monopoly power.
3The situation in Russia (and other transition economies) stands in stark
contrast (see Portes (1993), Estrin (1994), World Development Report
(1996)). 
This paper employs evidence from a recent, in-depth survey of
394 Russian manufacturing firms.  Organized by the World Bank, the
survey was conducted by VTsIOM (the All-Russian Center for Public
Opinion Analysis) on a sample drawn from a complete list of all
Russian industrial firms in 1991 with employment greater than 15.  The
population was first stratified by industry and region, and then an
initial sample was randomly drawn.2  Sample replacement (of firms on
the initial list which declined to participate) was implemented on the
basis of industrial branch in addition to size and region.3
In the following section, we outline hypotheses about the
relationship between ownership form, market structure, international
competition and budget constraints on the one side, and enterprise
behavior on the other.  We also specify the data proxies to be used for
ownership and market structure respectively.  The results are reported
in the third section, and conclusions are drawn in the fourth.
2. HYPOTHESES AND DATA
It is not our intention in this paper to offer major new theoretical
insights, but rather to bring together a variety of strands of the
structure--conduct-performance and corporate governance literatures,
to be applied in the transition context.  In the following sub-sections
we outline the estimation framework and hypotheses, and in the
subsequent subsections consider specification of performance, of
ownership form and of market structure respectively.  The basic
hypotheses are that company performance will be superior4 in more
competitive markets, with private ownership and when budget
constraints are hard.  The approach to measuring performance in
transition derives from Earle and Estrin (1996)) and the information on
ownership, market structure and international competition comes from
4official sources and the Russia survey itself.
52.1. Hypotheses
The underlying framework is captured in the equation:
Pi = Pi (owni, comp i, impi, hbci, 0i) (1)
where i denotes firms; Pi denotes an indicator of enterprise
performance; owni specifies ownership form; comp i indicates domestic
market structure; imp i denotes international competition; hbci indicates
hardness of budget constraint; and 0i is a vector of other covariants of
performance, for example regional variables.
The Western literature contains numerous examples of papers
which estimate the relationship between company performance and
domestic market structure (see eg Scherer and Ross (1990)).  Company
performance is often proxied by profitability or price-cost margins, and
market structure by concentration indices or Herfindahls (see
Sleuwaegen and Dehandschuffer (1986)), and of course more
competition implies lower profits; the industrial organization literature
predicts a positive relationship ceteris paribus between profitability or
margins and the degree of concentration (see eg Tirole(1989)).  Recent
work on efficiency and technical change has gone on to  suggest that,
because incentives are dulled by monopoly power, competitive firms
will also be more efficient in terms of factor productivities and
innovativeness (see eg Nickell (1995)).  In the transition context, one
might also  assume that competition will be the major force leading
firms to raise productivity, reduce waste and improve performance (see
eg Blanchard et al (1990), Stiglitz (1994) Dyker and Barrow (1995)).
In recent years, international competition has become one of the
most significant factors determining market power in particular
countries. This has been increasingly reflected in empirical work which
has sought to relate profitability, or conversely technical efficiency, to
measures of import penetration (see eg Geroski and Jacquemin (1981),
Esposito and Esposito (1971)).  While analyses of progress in transition
stress the importance of free trade, increased exports to the West and
6impact penetration (see eg EBRD Transition Report, (1994) and
(1995), World Bank Development Report (1996)), there have been
virtually no attempts to test the hypothesis of imports as a competitive
pressure on firms in the transition context (but see Earle and
Woergoetter (1993)).
The Western literature has also been very concerned with the
relative performance of state owned and private firms.  Because state
owned firms may have different objectives, such as the social targets of
the government, or because managerial performance is harder to
evaluate and corporate governance more difficult to enforce under state
ownership (see egEstrin and Perotin (1991)), it is predicted that state
owned firms will be less efficient than their privately owned
counterparts.  This has been tested in a variety of ways, usually in the
context of production or cost functions with dummy variables
controlling for different ownership.  The British privatisations of the
1980s have also allowed for tests of productivity changes as a
consequence of changes in ownership form from state to private (see eg
Vickers and Yarrow(1988)), Bishop, Kay and Mayer (1994)).  Vining
and Boardman (1992) have also sought to distinguish between
ownership and competition effects on enterprise behavior.  There have
been surprinsingly few studies of ownership effects in the transitional
context (but see Estrin (1996)) for a survey of findings).  
Finally, Kornai (1980) argued that poor enterprise performance
in socialist economies was associated with soft-budget constraints, that
is to say the knowledge of managers that their firm would be subsidized
by the authorities whatever their own performance.  Clearly the
eradication of soft budget constraints, especially when associated with
the disappearance of company specific rents because of the more
competitive market environment, should also lead to an improvement
in company performance, notably in the areas of reducing cost and
raising efficiency.  There is considerable case study and survey evidence
that this factor has been important in improved company performance
in Central Europe (see eg Pinto et al (1993), Estrin et al (1995), Carlin
et al (1996). In the transition context, there has been considerable
7speculation (e.g., Friedman and Johnson (1995)) that certain types of
reform may be highly complementary.  For instance, privatization may
yield higher benefits when prices, imports, and the entry of new
businesses are liberalized, and vice versa.  It could be that competition
in the product market only acts as a discipline on private owners, or
that monopolists behave no differently whether they are owned
privately or by the state.  Yet there have as yet been no empirical
studies which attempt to test whether such mutually reinforcing effects
of private ownership and competitive markets have actually been
present.
We therefore set out to test in the transition context a positive
relationship between company performance in the sense of efficiency
or productivity on the one hand, and private ownership, increased
competition at home and abroad and harder budget constraints on the
other.  The remainder of this section considers appropriate ways to
measure the five variables in question.
2.2. Indicators of Company Performance in Transition
Firms in the former socialist economies were structured quite
differently from competitive capitalist firms; products were produced
for planners, not markets; plan targets were taut with rewards for
attainment; and financial controls were non-existent (see eg Ellman
(1989) for a full discussion).  This led to emphasis on physical
production for the state with little or no reference to product saleability
or quality, and little concern for cost, particularly with respect to labor,
capital and energy.  Quality problems as well as weaknesses in
innovation were exacerbated by price distortions, for example in favour
of necessities and intermediates but against final products, and
especially in energy inputs.  Measuring the process of adjustment
from such a starting point to that implied by a competitive market
system is a multi-faceted phenomenon, though improvements in
productivity clearly play a pivotal role (see Tirole (1988) on
restructuring in capitalist firms, and McMillan (1996) for a survey of
8restructuring in transitional economies).  Earle and Estrin (1996) argue
that one can focus on three key aspects of restructuring in the context
of transition, namely: -
i) Long run restructuring, notably investment in new capital
to improve production techniques, quality and product
range and changed R&D incentives.  Also relevant is
enterprise unbundling, because socialist firms were highly
vertically integrated to avoid the problems caused by plan
uncertainties.  An important element of restructuring, as
well as a way of financing developments in the core
business, involves divestment of non-core productive and
social assets.
ii) Short term restructuring to raise efficiency, notably
reducing the labor, energy and material intensity of
production, without offsetting increases in capital intensity.
iii) “depoliticisation” or breaking the economic, social and
political links between the firm and the state.  In addition to
state subsidy, which is a determining variable on enterprise
behavior, key indicators here are the scale of output to, or
the purchase of inputs from, the state.5
These three aspects of restructing form the basis of the empirical work
which follows.
2.3. Performance and Ownership Changes in Transition 
The Western literature argues that private firms will perform
better than state owned ones, for reasons of sharper incentives and a
more profit-oriented motivation.  However, the comparison is typically
made between large publicly quoted Western companies, where the
stock market can play a significant role in disciplining company
performance, and public enterprises, where they cannot.  Several
authors (eg Aghion, and Blanchard (1996)) have stressed that the
9benefits of privatization depend on whether the owners are outsiders to
the firm.  But as Earle and Estrin (1996) show, privatization in the
transitional economies has not taken the standard form of selling to
highest bidder, associated with the simultaneous emergence of a capital
market and external ownership.  Instead, most countries have followed
a strategy of “mass privatisation” (see Estrin (1994)) with the result that
insider ownership predominates. It is not clear that privatization will
necessarily lead to improved governance, and therefore improved
economic performance, in this case.
Hypotheses about the impact of ownership form on competition
in transitional economies may need to be specified quite carefully, to
take account of the form of ownership which has emerged.  In our
empirical work we therefore first segment the data into state owned
firms and privatized firms by including as an independent variable the
proportion of shares in private hands (PSH).  We then go on to control
for the relative stake of insiders and outsiders in privatized firms, by
including separately the shareholding of outsiders (OSH), workers
(WSH) and managers (MSH).
In general, we would predict private ownership to improve
performance.  However, such developments may be less marked, or
even perverse, in firms with large insider shareholdings.  Indeed there
may be a plethora of effects from different ownership structures,
depending on the particular performance indicator used.  Outsiders are
the best suited ownership group for long term restructuring, (see
Aghion and Blanchard (1996)) because they would take the most
dispassionate view of existing production organizational structures.
They also suffer least in principle from agency problems that might
restrict the ability of insiders to raise finance from capital markets (see
eg Hansmann (1990)).  When comparing the two insider groups,
managers are probably  preferable to employees as owners in terms of
their likely access to external capital.
Turning to short run restructuring, once again outsiders are likely
to be the most clearly oriented to maximize profit and minimize cost,
and to have the least qualms about the necessary changes.  However,
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there is some descriptive evidence from the transitional economies that
outsiders have problems establishing effective corporate governance
and control over firms (see Frydman, Gray and Rapaczynski (1996)).
Moreover as Pinto et al (1993) and Estrin et al (1995) suggest, if
product markets are competitive and budget constraints hard, insiders
may be forced to restructure production anyway.  In comparing workers
against managers as owners, both have equivalent incentives to cut all
waste and inefficiency except that associated with overmanning.
Because workers as owners however might be expected to use their
control rights to secure their own jobs, employment changes, especially
via involuntary redundancies, are likely to be less when worker
ownership is significant.
2.4. Ownership Change in Russia
The pace and magnitude of ownership change in Russia in the
early 1990s dwarf any contemporary or historical comparisons.  From
an initial condition of nearly 100 percent state ownership in the
manufacturing sector in 1990, most enterprises had been mostly
privatized by mid-1994.  Table 1 shows the percentage of shares held
by the state and by the private sector, as well as the percentage of firms
more than 50 percent privatized as of July 1994, for broad industry
groups and roughly 2-digit branches of industry for the sample of firms
in the World Bank survey data.6
Overall, 62 percent of formerly state-owned shares were privately
owned, and 67 percent of former state enterprises were subject to the
potential control of private owners (defined as greater than 50 percent
ownership).  The pattern differs by branch, however:  rates of
privatization are highest in consumer goods sectors and lowest in
energy and fuel.
The Russian privatization program resulted in insider domination
in the vast majority of cases, as shown in Table 2.  Of the average 62.4
percent of private shareholdings for all the companies in the sample,
more than three-quarters, or 48.2 percentage points are owned by
insiders, of which more than two-thirds belong to workers.  Once again,
11
the patterns differ significantly by sector.  For instance, although
insiders dominate overall, there are nonetheless significant pockets of
outside ownership in the Russian economy.  Outsiders are especially
prevalent in heavy industry.7 
2.5. Domestic and International Competition
In this sub-section we provide five alternative measures of
concentration and import penetrating in Russian markets, each picking
up slightly the different notions of market competition.  Means for the
variables by industry groups are shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5.
Our first set of indicators draws upon two studies of concentration
in Russia:  Brown, Ickes, and Ryterman (1994, henceforth BIR) and
Joskow, Schmalensee, and Tsukanova (1993, henceforth JST).  BIR
present 4-firm sales concentration ratios calculated by PlanEcon for 2-
digit branches in 1989; we have labelled this variable CR4B.  JST
present 4-firm sales concentration ratios at a more disaggregated level
(approximately 4-digit industries) in 1991, but for a limited number of
sectors:  only 101 firms.  Given the substantial arbitrariness in defining
levels of disaggregation across heterogeneous classes of products, and
assuming there was little change in market shares from 1989 to 1991
(since the major reforms started in 1992), we have also combined the
two variables, using CR4J when it is available, and otherwise using
CR4B; the new variable is called CR4BJ.  The variables show quite a
high variance in concentration:  CR4BJ has a mean of .27 and a range
from .03 to 1. This is perhaps a surprisingly low mean given the
traditional view of large scale of socialist firms, and reflects the large
size of the Russian market in comparision with the typical socialist firm
in, for example, Bulgaria or East Germany.
The second set of indicators uses the information in the survey to
estimate Herfindahl-Hirschman indices for 2-digit sectors.  To minimize
the number of missing values, we use employment as the base variable.
To calculate appropriate weights, we use data from 1993, when
aggregate employment figures by sector are available.  HIRAW is
12
simply the sample index for each sector:
  ,
HIRAW'j
m
j'1
S 2j
where Sj = share of firm j in sectoral employment in the sample of m
firms in the sector.  Our sample was stratified by size (as well as
region), and if we maintain the assumption that the size distribution is
also representative for each sector, then it is possible to estimate the
index for the population quite simply as follows:
HIADJ = (m/n)*HIRAW,
where m/n is the ratio of the number of firms in the sample to the
number in the population for each sector.8  HIRAW also displays quite
significant variation with a range from .09 to .87, but HIADJ achieves
a maximum of only .05.
The potential for foreign competition to exert some disciplinary
effect in Russia is frequently discounted (for instance, in JST, p. 303).
However, the import share is actually rather high, which suggests that
we should undertake an explicit test of the hypothesis. IP0 (derived
from Roskomstat data) is import penetration from the "far abroad,"
which excludes the former Soviet Union; while IP1 (from the World
Bank) includes all imports.  Both variables take output+imports-
exports for each sector as the denominator, and the two variables are
highly correlated. 
The next group of indicators in Table 3 adjusts the concentration
ratios above for import penetration.  We multiply each concentration
ratio by (1-IP1) which represents the share of domestic sales accounted
for by domestic producers; where import penetration is greater, the
sales concentration ratio is correspondingly reduced.9  In fact, this
adjustment has a significant impact on measured concentration,
reducing both its mean and its variance.  But there is still significant
variation across sectors, for instance from .03 to .77 in CR4BJIP1.
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The final indicator in Table 3 comes from the survey: PRICONT
is a dummy equal 1 if the firm reports that the prices for its major
products are subject to state control.  The 1991 Law "On Competition
and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity in Goods Markets" defined
dominant market position as 35 percent or more (to be set annually by
the State Committee on Anti-Monopoly Policy), and the 35 percent
definition was used in the "anti-monopoly lists" which the government
ordered local anti-monopoly committees to compile in early 1992.
According to JST (p. 339), "[I]n August 1992, the Gaidar government
ordered federal and regional price committees to regulate the prices of
most goods produced by firms on the monopoly registers."  Although
this authority was supposed to expire at the end of 1993, it seems that
much of the regulation continued.  Thus, the existence of price controls
may reflect market power, at least as perceived by local anti-monopoly
committees.
Table 4 contains a group of subjective indicators of the extent of
market power based on responses to questions on the survey of firms.
Managers were asked to report whether they had "major competitors
for [their] major products" and, if so, how many.  "Major competitors"
is not precisely defined in the survey question, and no doubt it would
have been difficult to do so in economically meaningful terms.  On the
other hand, given the difficulties in choosing the appropriate size of the
market for any given firm and of measuring the strength of actual and
potential competitors in it, the managers' subjective evaluation may be
an indicator worth investigating.  We define MAJCOMPD as a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the manager reports that the firm faces a major
competitor, and 75 percent (the mean of MAJCOMPD) of firm
managers report that they do.  Taken literally, this would imply that
one quarter of the sample firms are monopolists or dominant firms in
their industry.  MAJCOMP# is the number of major competitors, equal
to zero if MAJCOMPD is 0, and the average is 21.
The managers were also asked to report the geographic
breakdown of the competition they face; under the presumption that
foreign competition may be a particularly powerful disciplinary device,
14
we have computed the variables MAJFORD and MAJFOR#, measuring
whether the firm reports any foreign competitor (= 1 if so; = 0
otherwise) and the number of foreign competitors, respectively.  In fact,
a surprising number of Russian firms - 51 observations, or 20 percent
of the valid sample -- report that they face foreign competition.  The
average number of foreign competitors is 9 (including zeroes).
Transportation and infrastructural deficiencies probably act as a
barrier not only to foreign competition, but to domestic producers
located in other regions as well.  To provide some assessment of the
geographic dimension in which firms operate, we provide, in Table 5,
a summary of the firms' reports on the extent to which revenue is
generated locally (RAYON), regionally (OBLAST), nationally
(NATIONAL), and from 3 different categories of countries importing
Russian goods (former Soviet Union (FSU), former CMEA (CMEA),
and non-fSU, non-CMEA markets (WEST)).  While on average 50
percent of revenue is derived from markets which the firms describe as
national, there is considerable heterogeneity.  The hypothesis for these
variables is that the wider the geographic scope of the market, the more
competition faced by the firm; thus, concentration ratios should be
adjusted accordingly.
3. SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS
3.1. Specification 
In estimating equation (1) to test the hypotheses derived in the
previous section, we need first to specify our proxies for company
performance, capturing elements of both short term and long term
restructuring.  As an indication of long run restructuring in the product
market,10 we use CORPROD; the simple correlation coefficient
between the structure of a firm's production post-reform  in 1994, with
that pre-reform in 199011.  As can be seen in Table 6, some firms
changed the composition of their outputs dramatically, but on average
15
there was only moderate adjustment:  the mean correlation is 0.56.   
We also use labor productivity as an indicator of performance.12
To control for the fact that labor productivity may vary systematically
for a variety of reasons (for instance, different capital/labor ratios)
across firms, we include the lagged (pre-reform) level on the right-hand
side of the equation.  Two versions of labor productivity, defined as
nominal sales per employee (S/EMP), and real output per employee
(RX/EMP), are shown in Table 6, both for 1994 (subscript 4) and the
lagged value in 1990 (subscript 0). To go more deeply into the labour
restructuring issue, we also consider the layoff rate because to bring
employment levels into line with production, after the large decline in
output, requires involuntary reductions in employment.  LAYOFF is
defined as the firm's layoff rate13 from the beginning of 1992 until the
time of the survey in July 1994.
We have investigated a wide variety of specifications of the model
(1).  We report the same six specifications in all the regressions because
we feel they cover the most important conceptual alternatives.  The
pattern of findings are similar in all the other specifications, many of
which are reported in the textual endnotes.  We allow for 2 alternative
specifications of ownership and 3 alternative specifications of
competition.  The first ownership specification, PSH, the percentage of
shares in the firm which are privately held.  The second comprised
WSH, MSH, and OSH, a disaggregation of PSH among workers,
managers, and outsiders respectively.
  The competition specifications are as follows:
COMP1: CR4BJ, CR4BJ*IP
COMP2: (1/(MAJCOMP+1)), MAJFORD
COMP3: PRICONT
Combining, the two ownership and three competition formulations
yields six specifications for each of the four dependent variables.  To
control for the hardness of budget constraints, GOVSUP, a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the firm reports having received any kind of state
16
support between 1992 and 1994, is included in all specifications.  The
lagged dependent variable is included in productivity equations. We
also estimated equations which included regional dummies and the
measures of the geographic scope of the firm's markets (from Table 5),
entered separately, as well as interactively with CR4BJ, with
CR4BJ*IP, and with IP.  Finally we added interactions of the OWN
and COMP variables to some specifications in order to test for possible
complementarity between ownership and market structure factors.
None of these additions materially affected the results from the six
specifications shown in Tables 7 to 10.14
3.2. Econometric Results
Commencing with long run adjustment, the results of estimating
equations with CORPROD as the dependent variable appear in Table
7.   A positive coefficient implies less product market restructuring (a
higher correlation in product range pre and post-reform) on the part of
privatized firms.  At first sight, there appear to be no ownership effects;
the coefficient on PSH is positive, but nowhere precisely estimated. But
as we argued above the form of private ownership may be as important
as the fact of privatisation.  We hypothesised that firms with
predominant worker ownership would be less likely to engage in
internal re-organization insofar as such restructuring creates losers as
well as winners inside the firm.  In specifications where the effects of
different types of new share-owners can be disentangled, WSH is
indeed positive and significant.  Worker owned firms undertake this
type of restructuring significantly less even than state owned firms, the
omitted category.  Only MSH is always negative, and only weakly
significant in conjunction with COMP2 (specification 4).  Managerial
ownership does appear to spur long term restructuring, at least weakly.
Interestingly, outsiders in Russian firms also seem less eager to engage
in long term restructuring; in specification 4 the coefficient is also
positive and significant.
The competition variable which shows up significantly in this
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equation is the interaction of the concentration ratio with the import
penetration ratio.  This result, (which holds when IP is entered
separately), suggests that imports stimulate long term adjustment.
Neither the firm’s subjective evaluation of the market structure, nor that
of the local anti-monopoles committees, is significantly related to
enterprise behaviour.  There is no direct effect from harder budget
constraints on this indicator of long term restructuring.
The equations for the two measures of labour productivity
(nominal and real) are contained in Tables 8 and 9.  The results in
Table 8 demonstrate a clear positive effect of privatization on
productivity, measured as by sales per worker in 1994.  The magnitude
of the coefficient is large, suggesting between 0.3 and 0.5 percent
increase in productivity for each additional percentage of shares which
are privately owned.  The result holds across all specifications which
include PSH, although when ownership is disaggregated among
workers (WSH), managers (MSH), and outsiders (OSH), the results are
significant only for MSH and OSH together with COMP2.   Thus we
confirm that what matters for productivity changes is not only
privatisation, but the form of privatisation and the character of the new
private ownership.  Managerial and outsider ownership raises the
nominal value of sales per worker from the pre to post-reform period,
relative to state ownership; however worker ownership does not.
Once again, the only significant competition variables are in
COMP1.  Sales per employee are increased by concentration (CR4BJ),
but lowered by import penetration (CR4BJ*IP).  Because sales are
defined in nominal terms, it is difficult to know if these results imply
that monopoly raises productivity and that import competition reduces
it, or (more likely) that monopoly raises prices and import competition
reduces monopoly power.  As before, the specifications with other
definitions of market power (COMP2 and COMP3) return no
significant affects of the market environment on firm productivity.  The
existence of government subsidies are never significantly related to
sales per worker.  In summary,  the nominal value of sales per worker
appear to be affected in ways predicted by theory for market structure
18
and ownership, but not softness of budget constraints.
 The estimations with real output per employee15 (RX/EMP) are
shown in Table 9.  The equations  confirm the positive effect of
privatization, and most particularly of managerial share ownership, on
productivity.  For the Comp 1 specification, we once again find a
positive significant coefficient on PSH and MSH.  The lack of
significance of any of the competition variables including the market
structure and import pressure variables, which proved successful in the
previous equations, strengthens the suggestion that market power may
have enabled firms in Russia to raise prices, but not efficiency.  Hard
budget constraints again do not appear to be  associated with increased
labour efficiency. 
Finally we consider explicitly the issue of restructuring via layoffs
Table 10.  Private ownership is found to be positively associated with
layoffs and it is interesting to note that these ownership effects come
particularly from managerial ownership.  Workers as owners therefore
lay off their colleagues at the same rate as state owned firms.  We also
find that government subsidy acts to reduce the layoff rate; hence
budget softness is correlated with attempts to maintain employment
levels.  Competition does not affect the rate of layoff in these
equations, presumably because so far most employment changes have
been voluntary.  To test the notion that privatization and competition
may have a complementary relationship (for instance, so that
competition would only have an effect on privatized companies), we
also tried specifications including interaction terms for OWN and
COMP.  These were undertaken for specifications 1, 3 and 5 of the
reported equations.  However, the estimated coefficients on these
variables were not significant.  Here we cannot accept the view that
privatization and competition are complementary in the reform process.
In summary, competition and ownership form affect prices and
long term restructuring, but probably not underlying productivity.
Managerial  ownership does however stimulate deeper restructuring
than worker or outsider ownership.  Soft budget constraints appear
primarily to affect the maintenance of employment levels and the layoff
19
rate.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have made an initial attempt to measure whether
the recent change of regime in Russia has had consequences for
enterprise behavior.  That some aspects of behavior have changed
substantially is not in doubt, as a glance at our summary statistics or a
few visits to Russian enterprises can attest.  But whether those changes
can be linked in a systematic way to policies in such areas as
privatization, liberalization or to the hardening of budget constraints is
trickier.
Some might argue that it is still too early to look for systematic
relationships.  The privatization program only finished its first, "mass"
phase in mid-1994 (the time of the survey from which we draw most of
our information in this paper), and sales of the remaining shares and
companies are still ongoing.  Competition is also only gradually
evolving, as new companies grow large enough to compete with the
formerly state-owned behemoths and as foreigners gingerly test the
water.  Our results however suggest that some patterns are beginning to
emerge.
Privatization seems to have a clear and substantial effect on
restructuring, one which is robust across a wide variety of
specifications.  We also demonstrate that the specific type of new
owner can make a big difference; worker-ownership is associated with
less changes in the product mix and with fewer layoffs, while
managerial ownership is associated with more of both, and outsider
ownership with more product changes but no difference in layoffs.
Competition is also beginning to play a significant role, especially
competition from abroad.  Our results indicate the ability of
monopolists to raise prices and the degree to which import competition
may limit that power.   However, it is perhaps surprising that the
variables measuring the location of firms and the geographic scope of
20
their markets bore no fruit. This is in contrast to most commentators,
who maintain that market power in Russia is exercised primarily on the
regional level.  Our findings also suggest that soft budget constraints
can slow the pace of restructuring, at least in terms of labour layoffs,
even in privatised firms.
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1. For example, Pinto (1993) and Estrin et al (1995) find significant
restructuring in state owned firms because of harder budget constraints.  Estrin
(1996) surveys the evidence on the impact of privatization on enterprise behavior
in transitional economies.  There is however as yet no empirical work on the effects
of increased competition on enterprises in reform economies.
2. There are  problems of missing data run which reduce the usable set for the
purpose of assessing ownership to 321 observations.  Fan and Lee (1995) and the
appendix to Commander, Fan, and Schaffer 1996 contain detailed descriptions of
the survey.
3. The survey also included 45 firms in the new private sector, drawn from
separate regional lists.  We have excluded these new start-ups from the current
analysis, because we cannot observe them "before" and "after" the reform and they
do  not face the same restructuring problems.  
4. “Superior” performance in this literature means that costs and prices will be
lower, as perhaps will be profits and price-cost margins.  However, total factor
productivity and perhaps innovativeness will be higher.
5. Frydman and Rapacyzski (1994) have convincingly argued that the incentives
to seeking profit rather than rents (and therefore enterprise exposure to market
forces) depends crucially on the relative advantages to be obtained in the two
situations, with improved company performance depending on a decisive break
from non-profit-maximizing behavior.  We will not examine this aspect of
restructuring in this paper (but see Earle, Estrin and Leschenko (1995)).
6. These patterns and the privatization program which gave rise to them are
analyzed in greater detail in Earle, Estrin and Leschenko (1995).
7. Outsiders comprise primarily investment funds, other firms and individuals;
banks and especially foreign investors have not yet taken major stakes.
8. To demonstrate this,
define HI = population Herfindahl-Hirschman index =  j
n
i'1
P 2i
where Pi = proportion of employment of firm i in the population of the given
sector.  Say the sample contains m firms (as above) drawn from the n firms in the
population in a size-wise representative fashion, in which case Si = (n/m)Pi for any
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firm i in the sample.  Further suppose that the population can be decomposed into
K groups of equally sized firms, where groups are indexed by k, the kth group
containing lk firms.  Then HI can be written , since each element ofj
K
k'1
lkP
2
k
group k has an equal share Pk.  The sample can be similarly decomposed into K
groups, each of size (m/n)lk, and the sample index can then be expressed as 
 
HIRAW ' j
K
k'1
m
n
lk
n
m
Pk
2
'
n
m j
K
k'1
lk P
2
k '
n
m
HI
thus, substituting Si = (n/m)Pi from above.  Simplifying the equation yields the
formula for HIADJ (the approximation to HI),
HIADJ ' m
n
HIRAW.
9. This adjustment is suggested in Scherer and Ross (1990), p. 79.
10. Profitability may be a  poor measure of behavioral change, certainly so in the
short run, because many types of restructuring in transition may impose higher
short-run costs and only increase profits in the longer run (even leaving aside the
accounting problems which are multiplied in a situation of hyperinflation, where
the accounting system is itself undergoing a transition and few firms are subject to
rigorous outside audit).
11. Each firm provided the percentage of the value of its output obtained from
each of 3 major products in 1994 and from the same 3 in 1990.
12. We are unable to estimate technical efficiency on our sample because we do
not have data on the capital stock.
13. The ratio of number of workers laid off to the mean of employment in 1991
and employment in 1994. 
14. We tried a number of other specifications as well, including the Herfindahl-
Hirshman indices calculated from our sample, and various interactions of a number
of competition variables, but they were usually insignificant.
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15. The sample is smaller for real output than nominal sales because there are a
larger number of missing values.  Moreover, “real output” is a variable provided by
the firms themselves, rather than calculated by deflating a nominal output series.
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TABLE 1
Privatization By Sector of Russian Industry
Sector of Industry State Share Private Share PO % N
Energy & Fuel 52.4 47.6 42 19
    Energy 72.0 28.0 29 7
    Fuel 41.0 59.0 50 12
“Heavy Industry” 38.7 60.8 70 133
    Ferrous metallurgy 16.6 83.4 90 10
    Nonferrous metallurgy 21.1 78.3 88 8
    Chemicals 17.0 83.0 85 13
    Heavy machine building 30.9 69.1 75 20
    Electrotechnical 27.3 70.2 82 11
    Machine tools &
computers
60.9 39.1 43 14
    Automobile industry 23.3 76.2 89 9
    Agricultural machinery 41.9 58.1 69 13
    Light machine building 60.5 39.5 50 4
    Defense industry 53.4 46.6 73 11
    Ship building 38.2 61.8 75 8
    Radio industry 77.8 20.2 25 12
“Light Industry” 40.2 58.4 61 80
    Communications &
Electronics
43.1 54.9 60 15
    Metal constructions 28.6 69.4 79 14
    Machine repairing 35.8 61.0 53 15
    Wood harvesting 73.9 26.1 22 9
    Wood working industry 36.3 63.7 71 14
    Construction materials 35.5 65.5 69 13
“Consumer Goods” 28.1 71.7 74 89
    Textiles 17.1 81.6 82 22
    Clothing industry 10.8 88.6 90 21
    Food processing 41.6 56.8 67 18
    Meat and milk 11.0 89.0 82 11
    Other industrial
production
60.0 40.0 44 17
Total Industry 37.0 62.4 67 321
Notes:
PO % = percentage of firms in sector more than 50 percent privatized; N = number of firms in sample.
The total of State Shares and Private Shares does not always strictly equal 100, both because of rounding errors and because
of the occasional existence of  “other” owners whose property status was not specified.  However, the magnitude of these
unclassified “other” shares was never large enough to affect the categorization of the firm as predominantly state or privately
owned.
